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LUCIA V. SEC: THE DEBATE AND DECISION 
CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
SEC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
Elizabeth Wang* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A controversy has been brewing over whether or not the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s use of administrative law 
judges is constitutional. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), passed on July 21, 
2010, expanded the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC” 
or “Commission”) authority and ability to bring administrative 
proceedings. Since then there have been growing allegations that the 
use of these administrative tribunals is unconstitutional. In fact, the 
SEC filed a record number of enforcement actions in the fiscal year 
of 2016.1 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC2 represents the first federal 
court ruling on whether administrative law judges (“ALJs”) are 
employees of the SEC or rather inferior officers of the United States, 
which would subject their appointment to the Appointments Clause 
of the Constitution.3 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.B.A., St. Louis 
University, Missouri; B.S., Business Administration, Southwest Baptist University, Bolivar, 
Missouri. I wish to thank Professor Elizabeth Pollman for her encouragement, patience, and 
dedication in helping me along the way. Her guidance throughout the writing process and 
unrelenting positivity created a formative learning experience for which I am deeply grateful. I 
would also like to thank my husband, Jon, my in-laws, David and Darlene, my parents, Lyle and 
Tina, and my tenacious sister, Sarah, for their love and support because without them law school 
would have remained a dream. 
 1. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 
2016 (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-212.html (chart showing that 
in 2016 there were 868 filings versus 807 in 2015, and 755 in 2014). 
 2. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 3. Thomas J. Krysa & Lawrence W. Treece, A Key Victory For SEC in 
Battle over Administrative Courts, LAW 360 (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.law360.com 
/articles/828028/a-key-victory-for-sec-in-battle-over-administrative-courts. 
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In Lucia, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held Article II of the Constitution,4 which requires judges 
be appointed by the President and affirmed by the Senate, is not 
violated by the SEC’s use of ALJs, who are not appointed in this 
manner. This Comment argues, in so holding, the Lucia Court 
reached a decision that was both logical and reasonable.5 Since 
Lucia, a circuit split has developed6 which has further highlighted the 
importance of this issue and the need for the Commission to remain 
concerned and take action to address the perception of unfairness and 
lack of transparency, which caused the litigants to challenge the 
SEC’s administrative forum use. 
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part II details the 
background and history of legal issues surrounding the SEC and 
other administrative bodies’ use of ALJs. Part III sets out the facts of 
Lucia v. SEC. After analyzing the history and pertinent reasoning of 
the court in Parts II and III, Part IV considers the implications of the 
court’s holding in Lucia. Lastly, Part V concludes that the court 
correctly ruled on the merits in the case against Lucia because ALJs 
do not make final decisions or wield significant authority over the 
SEC. Notwithstanding the merits of the ruling, however, this 
Comment strongly encourages the SEC to take measures to improve 
perceived unfairness and lack of transparency. This has become more 
important in light of the circuit split created by the Tenth Circuit’s 
recent ruling in Bandimere v. SEC. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF LEGAL ISSUES 
A.  SEC Creation and Authority to Use ALJs 
Congress enacted the 1934 Exchange Act, a federal securities 
law, with the aim of restoring public confidence in corporate 
securities and the integrity of the stock market after the Wall Street 
Crash of 1929 preceding the Great Depression.7 The Exchange Act 
created the SEC to regulate exchanges, brokers, and over-the-counter 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“… Congress may by law vest the appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the Heads 
of Departments.”). 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 7. Securities and Exchange Commission, HISTORY (2010), http://www.history.com/topics 
/securities-and-exchange-commission. 
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markets.8 Congress subsequently expanded the responsibilities of the 
Commission; by 1960, the SEC administered six statutes including 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which bars fraudulent and 
material misstatements of material fact made by investment 
advisers.9 Then in 1961, President Kennedy designed a proposal to 
provide “greater flexibility in the handling of the business before the 
Commission, permitting its disposition at different levels so as to 
promote its efficient dispatch.”10 Congress allowed the Commission 
to delegate functions including “hearings, determining, ordering, 
certifying, reporting or otherwise acting as to any work, business, or 
matter” to an individual Commissioner, an ALJ, or an employee.11 
The delegation, however, did not include the Commission’s 
rulemaking authority, or right to review or intervene in an action, and 
it preserved certain instances where the SEC’s review of an ALJ’s 
decision is mandatory for adversely affected parties.12 
The statutory scheme and legislative history show that 
Congress’s goal was to grant the Commission “greater flexibility in 
the handling of the business before the Commission [. . . and] relieve 
the Commissioners from the necessity of dealing with many matters 
of lesser importance and thus conserve their time for the 
consideration of major matters of policy and planning.”13 As a result 
of Congress acceptance of President Kennedy’s proposal, the 
Commission gave ALJs the “authority to conduct administrative 
hearings” and make “initial decision[s].”14 If the action does not 
trigger a mandatory review, the ALJ prepares an initial decision 
along with an order and the Commission can then either review the 
initial decision on its own initiative or upon a petition, or if the 
Commission subsequently decides not to conduct a review, then an 
ALJ’s initial decision shall be deemed the action of the Commission, 
but only after the Commission issues a finality order.15 No passage of 
time will transform an initial decision of the ALJ into a final one; 
even default rulings must be given a finality order by the 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Lucia, 832 F.3d 277, 281, 290 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-21 (2016). 
 10. Id. at 281 (quoting 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1351, 1351-52). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 287. 
 14. Id. at 282. 
 15. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 282. 
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Commission.16 “Thus, the Commission must affirmatively act—by 
issuing the order—in every case.”17 
B.  The expansion of the SEC’s power via the Dodd-Frank Act 
The SEC may initiate an enforcement proceeding in two ways: 
by bringing suit in federal court, or by filing an administrative 
proceeding.18 In federal court, defendants have access to a jury trial, 
independent judges, and deposition “testimony [that] is subjected to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.”19 Alternatively, administrative 
proceedings are conducted before an ALJ, where there is no jury, 
discovery is restricted, hearings proceed on a rapid schedule, and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.20 
The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the SEC’s power in 
administrative proceedings in two ways.21 The Act expanded the 
reach of the SEC as to against whom it can initiate an administrative 
proceeding, and the Act increased the type and severity of penalties 
that may be imposed through those proceedings.22 
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, in the context of an administrative 
proceeding, the SEC could only impose civil monetary penalties, and 
only against an entity that was registered.23 These types of 
proceedings included claims for insider-trading, securities fraud, and 
unregistered securities.24 
Dodd-Frank expanded the SEC’s jurisdiction from registered 
individuals and entities to anyone who may have violated a securities 
law.25 Before Dodd-Frank, the Commission had to go to district court 
to take action against unregistered entities.26 After Dodd-Frank, the 
agency’s administrative jurisdiction expanded “to anyone alleged to 
have violated the securities laws, rather than only those registered 
with the agency, essentially permitting the agency to pursue any 
 
 16. Id. at 286–87. 
 17. Id. at 286. 
 18. Id. at 282. 
 19. Joseph Grundfest, Fair or Foul? SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for 
Reform Through Removal Legislation 1 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., 
Working Paper No. 212, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695258. 
 20. Id. at 3–6. 
 21. David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion of the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1164 (2016). 
 22. Id. at 1165, 1172. 
 23. Id. at 1170. 
 24. Id. at 1165. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Zaring, supra note 21, at 1165. 
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remedy against unregistered defendants that it could pursue against 
registered defendants.”27 
While ALJs cannot punish a person by prohibiting him or her 
from serving as an officer or director of a public company or forfeit 
incentive or stock based compensations, ALJs can levy serious 
penalties such as disbarment, which takes away the ability to practice 
as a broker or accountant and essentially ends an individual’s 
career.28 The Act increased the range of penalties the SEC can 
impose on individuals and business entities that commit serious 
violations.29 In addition to the civil penalties, the ALJ can issue an 
order for disgorgement.30 Disgorgement refers to “the repayment of 
illegally gained profits (or avoided losses) for distribution to harmed 
investors whenever feasible”—“intended to deprive the wrongdoer 
of ill-gotten gains.”31 
An even more severe punishment, referred to by some in the 
industry as the “equivalent of capital punishment,” is the SEC’s new 
ability to impose “collateral bars,” the same sanction imposed on 
Lucia,32 which goes further than disbarment and bans an individual’s 
association with the entire securities industry.33 Before the Dodd-
Frank Act, the SEC could bar a person from associating with the 
securities industry sector he had previously associated with that led 
to the charged misconduct, but not the securities industry in its 
entirety.34 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
The SEC initiated an administrative enforcement action against 
Raymond Lucia and the Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc., 
asserting that Lucia’s “Buckets of Money” retirement wealth-
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1170. 
 29. Id. at 1170, 1172. Subsequently, the SEC adjusted the penalty to account for inflation in 
accordance with the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015. 
See Adjustments to Civil Monetary Penalty Amounts, 82 Fed. Reg. 5367 (proposed Jan. 18, 
2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
 30. Zaring, supra note 23, at 1170–71. 
 31. Id. at 1171. 
 32. Lucia, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 33. Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 7 (2016). 
 34. Id. 
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management presentations violated the “anti-fraud provisions of the 
Investment Advisers Act.”35 An ALJ found Lucia liable because he 
made at least one material misrepresentation, and consequently 
imposed a “lifetime industry bar” against Lucia.36 Thereafter, Lucia 
petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ’s initial decision, and 
further argued that the presiding ALJ was not appointed in 
accordance with Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution 
(Appointments Clause).37 After an “independent review of the 
record,” the Commission concluded its ALJs were not covered by the 
Appointments Clause, and imposed the same sanctions as the ALJ.38 
Lucia appealed the Commission’s decision and order to the D.C. 
Circuit, arguing that the ALJ’s decision was invalid because the ALJ 
was not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.39 Thus, 
the key question on appeal concerned the constitutionality of the 
proceedings before the ALJ; if the ALJ were deemed an inferior 
officer, there would be no need to consider Lucia’s challenge to the 
liability and sanctions ruling.40 
B.  Holding and Reasoning 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that Commission 
ALJs are not officers within the meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, and thus, their appointment does not violate the 
Appointments Clause.41 As a result, the court did not have to grant 
the petitioner’s request for review.42 
Article II of the Constitution requires the President to appoint an 
inferior officer who is then confirmed by the Senate.43 The Supreme 
Court has explained that generally an appointee is an officer, and not 
an employee who falls beyond the reach of the Appointments Clause, 
if the appointee exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws 
of the United States.”44 
 
 35. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 282. 
 36. Id. at 282–83 
 37. Id. at 283. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 283. 
 41. Id. at 289. 
 42. Id. at 296. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 44. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
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In determining whether an ALJ has “significant authority,” a 
Court considers three criteria: “(1) the significance of the matters 
resolved by the official(s), (2) the discretion they exercise in 
reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those decisions.”45 In 
Landry v. FDIC, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the FDIC’s ALJs were 
employees rather than inferior officers because, while they did 
exercise “significant discretion,” they lacked final decision-making 
authority.46 The FDIC regulations limited its ALJs to issuing 
“recommended decisions,” and required the FDIC to consider and 
decide every case.47 
By contrast, in Freytag v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court 
determined the special judges of the Tax Court were “inferior 
officers” because they exercised “significant discretion” in carrying 
out their duties and functions, so the agency was “required to defer” 
to the special trial judge’s ruling unless it was clearly erroneous.48 
In Lucia, the primary disagreement revolved around the finality 
of the decisions issued by the SEC’s ALJs.49 Lucia agreed that a 
finality order issued by the SEC could not change an initial order 
from the judge into a “recommended decision.”50 But he argued that 
because the Commission can choose not to order or grant a full 
review of each case, the initial decision is essentially a final 
decision.51 
In siding with the SEC, the three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit 
found it critical that under the SEC rules, an ALJ’s initial decision 
could only become final upon an order of the Commission itself 
through a “finality order.”52 The United States Code provides that 
when the Commission does not review an ALJ’s action, it “shall for 
all purposes, including appeal or review thereof, be deemed the 
action of the Commission.”53 Lucia argued that based on the statute’s 
wording, the ALJ issues  final decisions for all intents and 
 
 45. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 284 (quoting Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 
2012)). 
 46. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 47. Id. at 1133–34. 
 48. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 288 (discussing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880–82 (1991)). 
 49. Id. at 285. 
 50. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286. 
 51. Id. at 285. 
 52. Id. at 286. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (2012). 
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purposes.54 However, Lucia introduced no evidence that the 
Commission simply “rubber-stamp[s]” the ALJs’ initial decisions.55 
While the statute may permit this approach, it also authorizes the 
Commission to establish its own delegation and review scheme.56 
The SEC has the authority to delegate any of its functions—
including hearing, determining, or ordering a matter—to an ALJ.57 
The Commission established its process to require action before an 
initial decision becomes final.58 In doing so, the Commission 
retained its discretionary right to review the action of any ALJ, and 
while it could have chosen to adopt a regulation whereby the ALJ’s 
initial decision becomes final, it did not.59 
After an ALJ renders a decision, a petitioner may then seek to 
appeal the decision by petitioning the Commission to grant review.60 
After a petition is filed, the Commission decides whether or not to 
review the ALJ’s decision, and take up the petitioner’s petition.61 If 
the Commission decides not to take up the petition, the Commission 
will issue a finality order which sets the date for when sanctions will 
begin and includes a statement that it is not reviewing the initial 
decision.62 “Until the Commission determines whether or not to 
order review, [ . . .] there is no final decision that can be deemed the 
action of the Commission.”63 
However, the Commission cannot sit on either an appeal or an 
initial order that is not being appealed and do nothing; it must make 
an affirmative “final decision” in every case.64 No passage of time 
can transform an initial decision into a final one.65 “The 
Commission’s final action is either in the form of a new decision 
after de novo review or, by declining to grant or order review, its 
embrace of the ALJ’s initial decision as its own.”66 In any 
circumstance, the SEC did not delegate any sovereign authority to 
 
 54. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 285. 
 55. Id. at 287. 
 56. Id. at 285. 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012). 
 58. See Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 282. 
 61. Id. at 286. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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act independently of the Commission to the ALJs, nor has Congress 
given them any power to act independently.67 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Administrative proceedings are far from uncommon amongst 
regulatory agencies. To deem the SEC’s use of ALJs unconstitutional 
would require the courts to undo years of legislation establishing the 
creation and workings of the agency.68 
This Part first addresses and supports the D.C. Circuit Court’s 
ruling on the merits that the SEC’s use of ALJs does not violate the 
Appointments Clause, and second discusses the work ahead for the 
SEC. 
A.  The D.C. Circuit Court Ruled Correctly  
The D.C. Circuit Court correctly ruled on the merits that the 
SEC’s administrative proceedings, which are overseen by ALJs, are 
constitutional. There is nothing in the regulatory history or precedent 
that indicates the ALJ who presides over an administrative 
enforcement hearing has been delegated significant authority to make 
final decisions for the SEC.69 Further, the court’s ruling reflects 
President Kennedy’s proposal that the SEC be “provid[ed] greater 
flexibility in the handling of the business before the Commission.”70 
In deciding how to best use the flexibility granted by Congress, 
the SEC chose not to delegate final decision-making authority to 
ALJs.71 The SEC is still required to “affirmatively act—by issuing 
the order—in every case.”72 The SEC intended ALJs to act much like 
a trial court—a court of first instance.73 The Commission’s retention 
of final decision-making authority supports an ALJ’s ability to 
perform fair trials and provide uncompromising rulings. 
On December 27, 2016, in Bandimere v. SEC,74 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the D.C. 
Circuit’s holding in Lucia and found the SEC’s use of ALJ’s to be 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See supra Part II. 
 69. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 287. 
 70. Id. (quoting 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2151). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Zaring, supra note 23, at 1195. 
      74.   844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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unconstitutional.75 The Tenth Circuit held that SEC ALJs are inferior 
officers rather than employees because they “exercise significant 
discretion in performing ‘important functions’ commensurate with 
the [special trial judges’] functions described in Freytag.”76 The 
Bandimere court reasoned that the Supreme Court “has not equated 
significant authority with final decision-making power.”77 Judge 
Briscoe’s concurrence notes that final decision-making power “might 
be sufficient to make an employee an Officer, [but] that does not 
mean such authority is necessary for an employee to be an officer.”78 
The SEC can petition the Tenth Circuit for a rehearing or a 
rehearing en banc, or can petition the Supreme Court with a writ of 
certiorari.79 A petition for rehearing en banc for Lucia is pending 
before the D.C. Circuit because of the Bandimere ruling.80 
While rehearing en banc and a grant of certiorari are rare, Judge 
McKay’s dissent expressing concern that the Tenth Circuit’s decision 
and interpretation of the Supreme Court’s precedent put “all federal 
ALJs at risk of being declared inferior officers” may draw attention 
to the circuit split and encourage review.81 It remains to be seen 
whether Bandimere will discourage the SEC from choosing to pursue 
enforcement actions in administrative court “at the same rate as in 
the past several years[,] or whether [the Bandimere] decision 
presages the SEC’s return to federal courts for the majority of its 
cases.”82 
B.  The Work Ahead for the SEC 
In light of the circuit split on the constitutionality of the SEC’s 
use of ALJs, further court battles may lie ahead. This Comment has 
argued that the D.C. Circuit correctly ruled on the issue in Lucia, and 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1179 (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
 77. Id. at 1184. 
 78. Id. at 1192 (Briscoe, J., concurring). 
 79. Breon Peace, Darryl Stein, & Lisa Vicens, Cleary Explores Appeals Court Split Over 
SEC Administrative Cases, CLS BLUE SKY Blog (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/01/11/cleary-delves-into-appeals-court-split-over-sec-
administrative-cases. 
      80.   Id. 
 81. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
 82. Breon Peace, Darryl Stein, & Lisa Vicens, Cleary Explores Appeals Court Split Over 
SEC Administrative Cases, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/01/11/cleary-delves-into-appeals-court-split-over-sec-
administrative-cases. 
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this section examines the lingering concerns about the SEC’s 
administrative proceedings and actions the Commission might take 
to alleviate these concerns. Many scholars and litigants have raised 
concerns of fairness over SEC enforcement proceedings.83 Most of 
the consternation seems to stem from a lack of transparency and 
perceived unfairness regarding the SEC’s forum selection process 
and the ability to bring unregistered defendants into administrative 
proceedings.84 Adjudication through an administrative proceeding 
raises several problems, including the lack of procedural protections 
for defendants in such proceedings, the increased penalties that an 
ALJ may impose, and the prospect that the SEC will deliberately 
bring an unresolved issue of securities law into administrative court  
to gain an advantage of legal interpretation when it is at odds with a 
federal court’s interpretation. 
As Alexander Platt, an associate at Boies, Schiller, and Flexner 
LLP, noted: 
The problem is not (or not only) that the SEC has been 
bringing more (and more important) cases in its home 
forum, that the procedures in that forum are deficient per se, 
or that the penalties available in that forum are draconian. 
Rather, the problem it is that, unlike in the past, under the 
SEC’s current enforcement architecture, procedural 
protections are not commensurate with penalties.85 
Professor David Zaring explains how these concerns grew after 
the passage of Dodd-Frank, which “expanded the agency’s 
administrative jurisdiction to anyone alleged to have violated the 
securities laws, rather than only those registered with the agency, 
essentially by permitting the agency to pursue any remedy against 
unregistered defendants that it could pursue against registered 
defendants.”86 Even the Wall-Street Journal has echoed concerns that 
the SEC acts as both judge and prosecutor in administrative 
 
 83. See, e.g., Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, Chau v. SEC, 
No. 15-461-CV, 2016 WL 7036830 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2016); Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 
513–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Targets of SEC enforcement arguing that the unfair discrimination lies 
in the selection of their case for administrative proceedings, while comparable cases go to federal 
court). 
 84. Platt, supra note 33, at 38. 
 85. Id. at 37. 
 86. Zaring, supra note 21, at 1165. 
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proceedings.87 These concerns are fueled not just by the Dodd-Frank 
Act, but also by statements made by SEC Director of Enforcement, 
Andrew Ceresney.88 In fact, a “dramatic shift can be seen in 
enforcement venues for public company defendants.”89 From 2010 
through 2013, the SEC brought more than 65 percent of its 
enforcement actions against these defendants in civil court, whereas 
in 2015 the SEC brought 76 percent of enforcement actions in 
administrative court.90 
The concern over procedural protections stems from the ALJ 
serving as both the finder of fact, as opposed to a jury, and the finder 
of law, as opposed to an independent judge, and also from the fact 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not apply in administrative proceedings.91 Instead, the 
SEC’s own Rules of Procedure govern the courtroom.92 
The perceived unfairness is compounded by the fact that 
penalties are no longer commensurate with procedural protections (or 
a lack thereof) in administrative courts.93 ALJs can now hand out 
civil penalties that were previously only available in district court.94 
While an ALJ cannot punish in precisely the same manner as a 
federal district court judge (such as prohibiting a person from serving 
as an officer or director of a public company), the Dodd-Frank Act 
has increased the size and type of civil penalties available in the 
administrative forum, incentivizing the SEC to bring more 
enforcement proceedings into this forum.95 Taken together, the 
 
 87. See Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor and Judge, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014, 
7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge-
1407195362 (“[A] surge in administrative prosecutions should alarm anyone who values jury 
trials, due process and the constitutional separation of powers.”); see also Stephen Bainbridge, 
Should the SEC Be Prosecutor, Judge, Jury, and Executioner?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM 
(Oct. 21, 2014, 8:53 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom 
/2014/10/should-the-sec-be-prosecutor-judge-jury-and-executioner.html. 
 88. Grundfest, supra note 17, at 2 n.3 (“In late 2013, SEC Director of Enforcement Andrew 
Ceresney, stated, ‘[o]ur expectation is that we will be bringing more administrative proceedings 
given the recent statutory changes [enacted through the Dodd-Frank Act].’”). 
 89. CORNERSTONE RES. & NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR L. & BUS., SEC ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIVITY AGAINST PUBLIC COMPANY DEFENDANTS: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015 
(2016), http://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-Against-
Public-Company-Defendants. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Zaring, supra note 21, at 1166–67. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Platt, supra note 33, at 43. 
 94. Zaring, supra note 21, at 1164, 1170. 
 95. See id. at 1170–72. 
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problem is that unlike in the past, under the SEC’s current 
enforcement architecture, procedural protections are not equivalent 
to penalties.96 
An additional concern stemming from another statement made 
by Chairman Andrew Ceresney is that the SEC may start using the 
administrative court to help the Commission substitute its 
interpretation of federal securities laws for the views expressed by 
the federal judiciary.97 Legal scholars are concerned that such use of 
administrative proceedings will not lead to the same balanced, 
careful, and impartial interpretations that would result from having 
those cases brought before a federal district court.98 
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Lucia only addressed the 
constitutionality of the SEC’s use of ALJs, but it did not resolve 
lingering concerns over the perceived unfairness and lack of 
transparency regarding forum selection related to the SEC’s 
enforcement proceedings.99 
The SEC took certain steps to balance procedural protections 
against increased remedies. The two changes the SEC announced 
included doubling the amount of time it allows from filing an action 
to the conclusion, and increasing allowances for discovery through 
depositions.100 The adopted amendments to proscribe how the SEC 
handles administrative proceedings only recently went into effect in 
late September 2015.101 It is too soon to tell how these changes will 
be received. 
Regarding the discovery tools, the SEC expanded the discovery 
rights for administrative proceedings.102 Traditionally, parties may 
take depositions by oral examination only if a witness were unable to 
attend or testify at a hearing.103 The recent amendments would allow 
 
 96. Platt, supra note 33, at 1. 
 97. Grundfest, supra note 19, at 8 n.21 (“If a contested matter is likely to raise unsettled and 
complex legal issues under the federal securities laws, or interpretation of the Commission’s 
rules, it may make sense to file the case as an administrative proceeding so a Commission 
decision on the issue, subject to appellate review in the federal courts, may facilitate development 
of the law.”). 
 98. Id. at 8–9 n.21. 
 99. See generally Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 100. Platt, supra note 33, at 4. 
 101. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing 
Administrative Proceedings (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
209.html. 
 102. Platt, supra note 33, at 2. 
 103. Id. at 5. 
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a maximum of three depositions in cases involving a single 
defendant and a maximum of five depositions in cases involving 
multiple defendants.104 The amendments also adopt a more liberal 
timeline, allowing for up to eight months (instead of four) for a 
hearing to begin after the filing of charges for complex cases.105 
Aside from what the SEC has already done, there are additional 
actions the SEC needs to take. The SEC needs to provide greater 
transparency in its data reporting, particularly regarding its exercise 
of discretion in forum selection.106 The SEC has declared that there is 
no “rigid formula,” but rather a “number of factors” it considers for 
forum selection.107 This vague approach, coupled with the agency’s 
proclamation that it will increase the use of administrative 
proceedings, has raised concerns and continued claims of unfairness. 
As Professor Joseph Grundfest argues, the agency could calm 
concerns about forum selection by providing more detailed and 
thorough sets of statistics regarding its filing choices and win-loss 
ratios.108 There are statistics available regarding the quantity of SEC 
enforcement filings, but there is not enough detailed information to 
dissect how many of these filings are substantive versus clerical.109 
This appears to be true for a variety of reasons. First, cases that settle 
before filing are usually recorded as an administrative proceeding.110 
Also, the agency registers “follow-on” proceedings and minor 
actions such as delinquent filings as administrative proceedings.111 
More detailed year-over-year reporting distinguishing between 
matters that “must be brought as administrative proceedings or 
federal civil actions from matters as to which the agency can exercise 
discretion over the relevant forum” is needed.112 
The imagined data would provide insight into currently 
obscured areas of the Commission’s processes and decision-making. 
 
 104. Id. at 40. 
 105. Grundfest, supra note 19, at 15–16. 
 106. Id. at 11–12. 
 107. Platt, supra note 33, at 21. 
 108. Grundfest, supra note 19, at 11 (“Put another way, the Commission has not historically 
reported its enforcement statistics in a manner that permits the accurate measurement of the 
extent to which it exercises its discretion in favor of its internal administrative proceedings when 
making its forum selection decisions. Nor do the agency’s data permit accurate analysis of the 
factors that influence its forum selection decision.”). 
 109. See id. 
 110. Platt, supra note 33, at 11 n.57. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Grundfest, supra note 19, at 11–12. 
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First, the data should distinguish among proceedings where the 
agency exercised its discretion in forum selection, (as compared to 
instances where a statute or another rigid factor dictates which forum 
must be used). When the Commission is exercising its discretion in 
which forum to bring an enforcement action the data should also 
reveal whether the defendant is registered or unregistered.113 
Additionally, the data should reveal the associated win-loss rates for 
these adversarial actions, screening for the number and types of cases 
that are required to proceed in administrative court by default or by 
statute.114 Ideally, the data set will prove that as much as possible the 
Commission is sending non-registered defendants to Article III 
courts, and will reveal that the Commission is not hampering the 
development of securities law by using administrative proceedings to 
gain influence for its interpretation of debated issues. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The SEC is facing a crisis of confidence regarding the fairness 
of its administrative proceedings. The Commission can respond to 
these concerns by changing its internal policies and providing greater 
transparency through reporting, which will bolster public confidence 
that litigation matters are being properly sorted between 
administrative and judicial forums. While these actions are advisable 
for the SEC, the cries of concern do not undermine the D.C. Circuit 
Court’s ruling that the Commission’s use of ALJs is constitutional. 
ALJs are not inferior officers wielding significant authority because 
their initial decisions have no way of becoming final decisions until 
the SEC chooses to act. Notwithstanding the merits of the ruling, 
however, and particularly in light of the Tenth Circuit’s recent 
Bandimere ruling, it remains advisable for the SEC to take measures 








 113. Id. at 10–11. 
 114. Id. at 12. 
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